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Elite professional athletes seem to commit violent crimes with dis-
tressing frequency.' The names Mike Tyson, Rae Carruth, Jason Kidd,
and Marty McSorley will immediately suggest to sports fans the variety
and seriousness of the criminal behavior of such athletes. While there is
no clear evidence that sports stars - who are predominantly young and
male - break the law any more frequently than other young males,2
there is at least a common perception that violent crime by athletes is on
the rise.3
As sports pages increasingly come to resemble a crime blotter, critics
often argue that the criminal justice system does a poor job of handling
cases involving athletes. Such arguments take two forms. First, critics
suggest that athlete defendants get off more easily than non-athlete de-
fendants who commit the same sorts of crimes.4 Second, critics suggest
* Assistant Professor, Marquette University Law School. B.A., Yale University; J.D. Yale
Law School. Many thanks to Donald Conty for his able and timely research assistance with
this Article.
1. "Elite professional athletes" (or, elsewhere in this Article, simply "elite athletes" or
"athletes"), refers to the highest-paid category of professional athletes. This category of ath-
lete prototypically encompasses the players in the National Football League ("NFL"), Major
League Baseball, the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), and the National Hockey
League ("NHL"). Because virtually all violent crime committed by elite athletes - at least
insofar as it has been studied by academics or reported in the press - involves male athletes,
masculine pronouns are used throughout this article to refer to elite athletes.
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. This perception may have less to do with changes in athletes' behavior than with a
breakdown in the traditionally "cozy" relationship between athletes and sportswriters, which
has led to increasing media coverage of athletes' off-the-field misconduct. When Role Models
Set a Bad Example: How Can a Kid Look Up to an Athlete Who's a Lawbreaker?, L.A. TIM.S,
Dec. 31, 1995, at M4 [hereinafter Role Models]. Additionally, society's attitude towards do-
mestic violence - one of the most common types of violent crime committed by athletes - has
grown increasingly intolerant. Thus, an incident of domestic violence that might have received
little police or press attention in prior generations might now result in both a criminal convic-
tion and national media coverage.
4. See, e.g., JEFF BENEDicr & DON YAEGER, PROS AND CONS: Tim CRIMINALS WHO
PLAY iN THE NFL 10 (1998); Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against
Women, 31 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 167, 171 (1998); Matthew McKelvey, Note, Separating
Sports and Real Life: How Professional Sports Leagues' Collective Bargaining Agreements
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that, because of their high visibility and unique status as role models,
elite athletes should be treated more severely than non-athletes.5 Both
lines of criticism raise the same threshold question: Should the criminal
justice system treat elite athletes differently than non-athletes?
This article considers the question in the context of one particular
stage in the criminal justice process: sentencing. Given the limitations
and objectives of sentencing laws, should elite athletes be sentenced dif-
ferently than other violent criminals? Such athletes often possess per-
sonal characteristics that distinguish them from more typical violent
offenders: wealth, social status, and highly paid employment. Indeed,
violent athletes might be characterized as white-collar offenders who
commit blue-collar offenses. Thus, a criminal justice system that seeks to
fit sentences not only to the crime, but also the criminal, might very well
treat elite athletes differently at sentencing than non-athlete
counterparts.
In assessing this thesis, the article proceeds as follows. Part I pro-
vides background on the prevalence of violent crime among elite ath-
letes and responses by the criminal justice system. Part II discusses basic
principles of sentencing law, focusing on three jurisdictions that re-
present the diversity of American sentencing schemes. Part III considers
three possible justifications for treating athletes differently, and suggests
that different jurisdictions might view the appropriateness of these con-
siderations quite differently.
1. ELITE ATHLETES AND VIOLENT CRIME
A. The Scope of the Problem
Jeff Benedict and Don Yaeger have conducted what may be the most
intensive - albeit much criticized - study of criminality in any profes-
sional sports league. They reviewed state criminal history records of 509
National Football League (NFL) players, comprising more than a third
of all players during the 1996-1997 season, and found that 21% (109
players) had been arrested or indicted for at least one "serious" crime.6
Keep Athletes Out of the Criminal Justice System, 27 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINE-
MENT 91, 92 (2001); Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1048, 1053 (1996) [hereinafter Out of Bounds]; Bill Brubaker, Violence in
Football Extends Off the Field, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 1994, at Al (noting allegations that
football players given preferential treatment by police and judges).
5. Thus, for instance, William Bennett argues that athletes should be held to a higher
standard. BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 9.
6. Id. at x. Benedict and Yaeger define "serious crime" to include homicide, rape, kidnap-
ping, robbery, assault, battery, domestic violence, reckless endangerment, fraud, larceny, bur-
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Between them, these 109 players had at least 264 arrests, or, on average,
nearly two and a half arrests each.7 More than half of these arrests were
for crimes of violence, ranging from armed robbery to domestic violence
to homicide.' While some of these arrests occurred before the targeted
player turned professional, at least seventy-seven players had been ar-
rested after entering the NFL.9
Benedict and Yaeger contend that their analysis is conservative be-
cause they include only arrests in states that make arrest records public.
Thus, for instance, the 264 arrests do not include a much-publicized
homicide arrest that occurred in a jurisdiction that would not release the
relevant records. 10 On the other hand, Benedict and Yaeger may over-
state the true level of player criminality by relying on arrest records,
rather than conviction records. An arrest may be made based merely on
a police officer's determination that a crime probably occurred, and
without any of the procedural protections afforded criminal defendants
at trial. Thus, many of the cases tracked by Benedict and Yaeger re-
sulted either in acquittal or dismissal of charges." However, as Benedict
and Yaeger observe, acquittal and dismissal do not necessarily indicate
innocence. Dismissal, for instance, may be conditioned on a defendant's
completion of a counseling program, or may reflect deference to the vic-
tim's wishes.' 2 In short, while Benedict and Yaeger's twenty percent fig-
ure may not be as conservative as they suggest, there seems little reason
to doubt the implication that a sizeable minority of NFL players has
committed violent crime.
Criminal behavior has not been studied as intensely in other sports
leagues. Because of the sport's intrinsically violent nature, one might
glary, theft, property destruction, drug-related offenses, illegal use or possession of a weapon,
DUI, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. Id The study was limited to the 509 players
who resided in states with public criminal history records. Id. This appears to be a reasonably
representative sample of NFL players. Id. (citing opinion to this effect by statistician Alfred
Blumstein).
7. Id. at 6.
8. 1d Here, this article uses "crimes of violence" also to encompass rape, kidnapping,
aggravated assault, assault and battery, resisting arrest, and other crimes against persons.
Benedict and Yaeger's analysis indicates that 142 arrests (out of 264) fall into one of these
categories. Id.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 7 (discussing arrest of Oakland Raiders running back Derrick Fenner). The
Benedict and Yaeger numbers also miss violent crimes that are not reported to the police or
that otherwise do not result in an arrest or indictment. Accordingly, domestic violence and
sexual assault - crimes that are notoriously underreported by victims and neglected by police
- may be significantly underrepresented in the Benedict and Yaeger study.
11. Id. at 263-72.
12. Id. at 272.
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suppose that football players are particularly prone to off-the-field vio-
lence. Reliable comparative statistics are not available. However, a sur-
vey of 252 nationally-reported criminal cases in one year involving
athletes found that about fourteen percent (or forty-nine) of the athletes
involved were professional football players, as compared to about seven
percent (twenty-five) professional baseball players and about six percent
(twenty-one) each professional basketball and hockey players.13 While
non-scientific, the survey is at least suggestive that professional athletes
who play other sports besides football also break the law in significant
numbers, amounting to perhaps dozens of high-profile incidents each
year. 1
4
Some commentators suggest that athletes, as a general proposition,
are more prone to criminal violence than non-athletes. Such commenta-
tors offer a number of theories in support of this claim. First, they con-
tend that "athletes are taught to be violent and aggressive and that it is
difficult for them to 'turn it off' when they interact with people in social
settings."' 5 Second, they argue, "[s]tardom, by nature, dulls adherence
to social norms."' 6 This tendency may be reinforced by the preferential
treatment accorded athletes in school,17 which allegedly gives rise to an
"I can do what I want" attitude. I8 Third, as to violence against women in
particular, commentators suggest that "sports may cultivate a 'macho
sub-culture' that equates masculinity with violence [and] 'denigrat[es]
anything considered feminine."'1 9 Indeed, violence against women may
13. Maryann Hudson, From Box Scores to the Police Blotter; 1995 Was a Rough Year for
Athletes and the Law, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1995, at Al.
14. Indeed, the survey also casts some doubt on the hypothesis that football players are
intrinsically more prone to criminality. While professional football players were involved in
twice as many incidents as any other category of professional athlete, the NFL has about twice
as many players (1395) as major league baseball (750) and the NHL (630), and about three
times as many players as the NBA (406). These statistics were calculated by multiplying the
current number of teams per league by the corresponding league limit. See generally, Players,
ESPN.COM, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/players (last visited Oct. 15, 2001); Play-
ers, ESPN.COM, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/players (last visited Oct. 15, 2001);
Players, ESPN.COM, available at http:lsports.espn.go.com/nbalplayers (last visited Oct. 15,
2001); Players, ESPN.COM, available at http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/index (last visited Oct. 15,
2001).
15. Dabbs, supra note 4, at 170.
16. JEFF BENEDICT, PUBLIC HEROES, PRIVATE FELONS: ATHLETES AND CRIMES AGAINST
WOMEN 215 (1997).
17. Dabbs, supra note 4, at 171-72.
18. Laurie Nicole Robinson, Note, Professional Athletes-Held to a Higher Standard and
Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the Need for States to
Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1317-20 (1998).
19. Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 1050 (quoting MICHAEL A. MESSNER & DONALD F.
SABO, SEX, VIOLENCE & POWER IN SPORTS: RETHINKING MASCULINITY 34 (1994)).
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represent the single most common type of serious crime perpetrated by
athletes. 20
Yet, while theories suggesting inherent tendencies to violence
abound, persuasive statistical evidence is in short supply. The Benedict
and Yaeger study indicates that NFL players are only half as likely to be
arrested as males with similar age and racial characteristics in the gen-
eral population.21 The authors suggest, however, that a more apt com-
parison would also take into account the education and income levels of
the NFL players. They hypothesize that NFL players are more prone to
commit crimes than other high-income, college-educated individuals
who are not athletes. 2 Comparative data of this nature is unavailable.5
The hypothesis may find some support, however, in one study of ten
universities indicating that a disproportionate number of the men re-
ported for sexual assault to university officials were athletes.24
B. Responses to the Problem
Much as commentators debate how prone athletes are to violence,
commentators have been similarly divided over the adequacy of societal
responses. Much criticism focuses on the policies and practices of league
and team management. For instance, one study indicates that, out of 141
athletes reported to police for violence against women between 1989 and
1994, only one was disciplined by league officials. 5 Likewise, among the
more than five hundred arrests studied by Benedict and Yaeger, only
two resulted in the arrestee being released from his team.26 Benedict
and Yaeger, like other commentators, believe that teams should release,
and leagues should ban, players who commit serious crimes.27
The criticism of team and league responses at least implicitly suggests
some dissatisfaction with the criminal justice system's responses: If the
legal system were delivering sufficient punishment and deterrence in
cases involving athletes, it is difficult to see why leagues and teams
should impose additional sanctions of their own. Indeed, some commen-
20. BENEDICr & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 149 (finding that the most common cause of
arrest among the sample of NFL players was domestic violence, surpassing even driving while
intoxicated).
21. Id. at 275-76.
22. Id. at 8.
23. Id. at 276.
24. Brubaker, supra note 4, at Al.
25. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1330.
26. BENEDIar & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 15.
27. Id. at 256-58.
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tators have explicitly argued that "police, judges, and juries are more
lenient when dealing with professional athletes. '28 Supporting evidence,
however, remains elusive.
The criminal justice process encompasses several distinct stages, in-
cluding: (1) the decision by prosecutors to initiate proceedings; (2) plea
bargaining; (3) trial, typically by a jury, if plea bargaining is unsuccessful;
and (4) if the defendant is convicted, sentencing by the judge. Favorit-
ism could potentially be shown at each stage. However, there seems lit-
tle basis to conclude that prosecutors show particular lenience either in
charging or plea-bargaining decisions. Indeed, if anything, commenta-
tors have been more likely to criticize prosecutors as unduly harsh. For
instance, the prosecution of Minnesota Vikings quarterback Warren
Moon on domestic violence charges over the objection of his wife was
criticized as an effort by the prosecutor to gain greater public exposure
for himself.29 A study of 217 sexual assault complaints involving athletes
from 1986 to 1995 indicated that at least fifty-four percent of the com-
plaints resulted in formal charges being brought by prosecutors.30 The
responsiveness of police and prosecutors in these cases seems to com-
pare favorably with sexual assault cases generally.31
A somewhat stronger argument can be made for pro-athlete bias on
the part of juries. In the eyes of many, the O.J. Simpson verdict would
supply a compelling example. In the study of reported sexual assaults by
athletes from 1986 to 1995, only fifteen percent of the cases that went to
trial resulted in conviction.32 The study also found that, while fifty-four
percent of rape arrests nationally result in conviction,33 only thirty-one
percent of the athletes arrested were convicted. 4 A separate survey of
domestic violence cases involving athletes in 1995 found a thirty-six per-
cent conviction rate, as compared to seventy-seven percent for the gen-
eral public. 35 Of course, the relative success of athletes in front of juries
may have just as much to do with their ability to hire superior defense
counsel as it does with jury favoritism. Moreover, to the extent that
cases against athletes are prosecuted more aggressively than cases
28. Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 1053.
29. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1328-29. A jury ultimately acquitted Moon.
30. BENEDICT, supra note 16, at 79-81.
31. Id. See also Robinson, supra note 18, at 1329.
32. BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 176.
33. Id.
34. BENEDICT, supra note 16, at 80.
35. Hudson, supra note 13, at Al.
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against non-athletes, one would expect that a larger proportion of the
athlete cases would be relatively weak on the merits. 6
In addition to prosecutors and jurors, judges also play a critical role
in the criminal justice process, perhaps most importantly as sentencers in
those cases in which the defendant is convicted. Are judges biased in
favor of athletes? Perhaps the most cited supporting evidence comes not
from a criminal, but a civil case in which baseball star Barry Bonds at-
tempted to reduce his family support payments. The judge granted the
requested relief, then requested an autograph.37 After a public outcry,
the judge later reversed his ruling and recused himself from the case.3
Judges in criminal cases have also had to defend themselves against
charges of favoritism. A Florida judge, for instance, recently faced such
criticism for failing to incarcerate baseball player Darryl Strawberry af-
ter his fifth probation violation.39
Yet, whatever the evidence of pro-athlete bias, there is also evidence
pointing in the opposite direction. For instance, in 1983, Kansas City
Royals baseball players Willie Wilson, Jerry Martin, and Willie Aikens
were sentenced to three months in prison for a misdemeanor drug con-
viction.40 As first-time offenders, they most likely would have avoided
incarceration altogether had they not been athletes, but the sentencing
magistrate explained that he was holding them to a "higher standard"
because they were "role models for children. ' 41 No statistical evidence
is available to suggest whether the Royals case is more or less typical
than the Barry Bonds case.
Whatever the typical practices of judges, the Royals case raises a fun-
damental question in sentencing athletes: Should athletes be treated dif-
ferently? Criticisms that the criminal justice system treats athletes too
leniently typically assume that the system ought to treat athletes the
same as non-athletes. Yet, arguments can be, and have been, made that
the particular circumstances of elite athletes warrant different treatment.
36. Juries might be biased in favor of athletes for a number of reasons. Not only are
athletes viewed as heroes by many, but, as Benedict suggests, they may benefit in sexual as-
sault cases from "popularly held cultural images of the jock-female relationship." BENEDICr,
supra note 16, at 79-81. "Citing the abundance of women available to popular athletes, ac-
cused sex offenders insist there is no need to resort to force ...." Id.
37. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1331.
38. Id
39. Malcolm Balfour & George King, Darryl's Final Straw, N.Y. PosT, May 18, 2001, at
97.
40. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1328.
41. Id.
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Indeed, as will be detailed in Part III below, arguments might be made
both in favor of greater lenience and in favor of greater harshness.
II. PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING LAW
When commentators criticize judges for sentencing athletes more le-
niently than non-athletes, their objection is to what sentencing scholars
would call "unwarranted disparity": i.e., treating similarly situated de-
fendants in a dissimilar manner. The central difficulty in identifying un-
warranted disparity lies in determining which defendants are "similarly
situated," that is, which defendants are substantially the same with re-
spect to those aspects of their offense, personal character, and back-
ground that are most pertinent to the sentencing decision. Thus, in order
to determine whether disparate treatment for elite athletes is warranted
or not, we must consider whether those particular offender characteris-
tics that are categorically associated with athletes (e.g., wealth and celeb-
rity) are pertinent to sentencing.
Judges usually have some discretion in deciding on a case-by-case ba-
sis which offender characteristics should be taken into account and how.
Yet, this discretion must be exercised within certain legal parameters. In
particular, sentencing law guides and constrains judicial discretion in at
least three relevant ways. First, sentencing law establishes global objec-
tives for sentencing, such as deterrence of future crime. In order to jus-
tify treating athletes differently at sentencing, such differential treatment
should advance the global objectives of sentencing. Second, sentencing
law requires (or at least encourages) the consideration of certain types of
offender characteristics at sentencing. For instance, judges must com-
monly consider prior criminal history when imposing a sentence. Third,
sentencing law forbids (or at least discourages) the consideration of
other types of offender characteristics, such as race. Thus, our analysis
must consider whether the unique characteristics associated with athletes
are required, encouraged, discouraged, or forbidden as sentencing
factors.
By establishing objectives and criteria for sentencing, the law pro-
vides a framework for determining whether elite athletes are situated
similarly to non-athletes for purposes of sentencing. Sentencing law,
however, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which considerably
complicates the analysis. This article will focus on three sentencing sys-
tems that are representative of the national variation: the federal sys-
tem, the New York state system, and the Minnesota state system. The
remainder of this Part will provide background about each of these sen-
tencing schemes.
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A. Federal Sentencing,
Sentencing at the federal level has undergone dramatic changes since
passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 ("SRA").42 Prior to the
SRA, federal judges had virtually unlimited discretion to sentence de-
fendants within broad ranges established by statute (e.g., zero to twenty
years). These sentences were subject to parole opportunities, which gen-
erally resulted in the release of prisoners after they had served between
one-third and two-thirds of their sentences. The SRA, however, abol-
ished parole and authorized the United States Sentencing Commission
to draft new Sentencing Guidelines limiting judicial discretion. The fed-
eral Guidelines require judges to consider certain specified offense and
offender characteristics in prescribed ways. The various tables and for-
mulae in the Guidelines establish a relatively narrow sentencing range
for each defendant (e.g., twelve to eighteen months). Judges retain dis-
cretion in selecting a sentence within this narrow range, but generally
may not impose a sentence outside the prescribed range (that is, the
judge may not "depart") unless either: (1) The judge finds that there
exists a mitigating or aggravating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion;43 or (2) the defendant renders substantial assistance to the
authorities.'
The changes in federal sentencing law have been accompanied by a
dramatic expansion in the reach of federal criminal law enforcement.45
While crimes of violence traditionally lay within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of state and local law enforcement, Congress has in recent years
enacted new federal criminal laws dealing with such diverse crimes as
drug-induced rape, sexual abuse of children, and carjacking.4 6 Addition-
ally, federal prosecutors have grown increasingly aggressive in using ex-
isting federal gun laws to prosecute defendants involved in routine street
42. 18 U.S.C. § 3551-3586 (1994).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b).
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINEs MANuAL § 5K1.1 (1998).
45. For a more detailed discussion of this trend, see Michael M. O'Hear, National Uni-
formity / Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sen-
tencing Disparities, 87 IowA L. REv. (forthcoming 2002).
46. See, e.g., Drug-Induced Rape Prevention and Punishment Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-305, 110 Stat. 3807 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 994 and in scattered sec-
tions of 21 U.S.C.); Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-314, 112 Stat. 2974 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 28
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.); Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901,2021-2044, 19 U.S.C. § 1646,42 U.S.C. § 3750, and
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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crimes. Perhaps most notably, "Project Exile," which has been imple-
mented by the United States Department of Justice in several cities,
channels into federal court nearly every crime involving a gun.47 Given
such recent developments, athletes who commit crimes of violence will
likely find themselves increasingly subject to federal prosecution, and
hence federal sentencing laws.
B. New York
To some extent, the state sentencing laws in New York reflect the
traditional sentencing model that the SRA jettisoned at the federal level.
Because New York has not adopted sentencing guidelines, judges retain
nearly unlimited discretion to determine sentences within broad statu-
tory ranges.48 To be sure, under the so-called "Rockefeller drug laws,"
as well as more recent statutes dealing with violent crimes, certain cate-
gories of offenses are subject to severe statutory minimum sentences. 49
Moreover, appellate courts may modify a sentence found to be "unduly
harsh or severe."5 Yet, appellate courts generally defer to trial courts,5 '
leaving New York's sentencing judges with substantially greater discre-
tion than their federal counterparts.52
C. Minnesota
Unlike New York, Minnesota has eliminated parole and adopted sen-
tencing guidelines, but has done so in a manner substantially different
from the federal model.53 Where the framers of the federal Guidelines
chose not to endorse any overarching penological theory,54 the Minne-
47. John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP.
L. REV. 673, 682 (1999).
48. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.02(3) (McKinney 2001) (establishing determinate sentencing
range for Class B violent felonies as five to twenty-five years, and range for Class C violent
felonies as three and one-half to fifteen years).
49. For example, sale of two ounces or more of cocaine is subject to a minimum indeter-
minate sentence of 15 years to life (that is, a defendant receiving the minimum sentence would
not be eligible for parole for at least 15 ydars). N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 220.43(1), 70.00(3)(a)(1)
(McKinney 2001).
50. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 470.15(2)(c) (McKinney 2001).
51. See, e.g., People v. Morris, 713 N.Y.S.2d 107 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); People v.
McNaney, 713 N.Y.S.2d 438, 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
52. People v. Farrar, 419 N.E.2d 864, 865 (N.Y. 1981) ("[T]he sentencing decision is a
matter committed to the exercise of the court's discretion ....").
53. For a thorough discussion of the history and theoretical bases of the Minnesota
Guidelines, see DALE G. PARENT, STRUCTURING CRIMINAL SENTENCES: THE EVOLUTION OF
MINNESOTA'S SENTENCING GUIDELINES (1988).
54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, policy statement (1998).
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sota Guidelines explicitly adopt the "just desserts" rationale of sentenc-
ing, i.e., the theory that sentences ought to be strictly proportional to the
severity of the offense. 5 Where the federal Guidelines are often criti-
cized for their complexity (e.g., by employing forty-three distinct "of-
fense levels"), the Minnesota Guidelines are substantially simpler (e.g.,
by using only ten different offense levels).5 6 Finally, the Minnesota
Guidelines are not mandatory for sentencing judges, but "advisory. ' '57
Minnesota judges may depart from the Guidelines "when substantial
and compelling circumstances exist"5  - a standard that has proven to be
far more flexible in practice than the federal departure standard.5 9
]JI. WHY MIGHT ATHLETES BE SENTENCED DFERENTLY?
This Part considers three possible justifications for sentencing elite
athletes differently than non-athletes who commit the same crimes.6 In
particular, this Part assesses the compatibility of such disparities with the
objectives and legal requirements of the federal, New York, and Minne-
sota sentencing schemes.
A. Enhanced Culpability
Elite athletes enjoy a very high socioeconomic status. This status ar-
guably gives rise to a higher degree of blameworthiness when they break
the law. Defendants from disadvantaged backgrounds often seek, and
occasionally receive, lower sentences as a result of the particular difficul-
ties they face in lifeP1 To the extent that disadvantaged backgrounds
entail lower culpability, wealth and status might entail greater culpabil-
ity. Elite athletes are presumed to know the law,6' to be capable of fol-
55. MINN. STAT. Am. § 244 app. I (West 2001). This contrasts, for instance, with rehabili-
tative and utilitarian approaches to sentencing.
56. I& § 244 app. H.A. The ten offense levels exclude first-degree murder, which is han-
dled separately under the Minnesota Guidelines. Id.
57. Id. § 244 app. I.
58. Id.
59. Kevin R. Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of
Federal and State Experiences, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1441, 1485 (1997).
60. This is not intended to be an exhaustive list. Other justifications may exist. The three
offered here, however, reflect the chief arguments that have been advanced to date in the
cases and the secondary literature.
61. See, e.g., People v. Demand, 702 N.Y.S.2d 441, 445 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (noting
sentencing judge's "careful" consideration of defendant's "unstable and troubled upbringing"
in imposing sentence).
62. Role Models, supra note 3, at M4 ("[T]hese athletes know the law, almost to the letter.
Their coaches and advisors drill it into them, for the team's sake, for the program and for the
coach's own fortunes in keeping the best players on the field.").
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lowing the law, and to possess uniquely compelling reasons for doing
so.63 Viewed in this light, crimes by such athletes seem marked by a
particular willfulness that might warrant harsher sentences.
William Bennett casts the issue as a form of noblesse oblige. "[T]he
expectation of standards ought to be higher for professional athletes," he
contends, "because of the public nature of their profession-the high
salaries, public exposure, and adulation. With all the benefits comes re-
sponsibility. '6 4 This responsibility may be particularly great insofar as
athletes function as role models for young people:
It's natural for boys, in particular, to look up to these big, fast,
strong men. They have a larger place in a child's imagination and
aspirations than the posse of heroes from other categories. They
dominate the stage. They are who kids are looking at most. So
what they do is critical. They have the possibility for encouraging
or discouraging responsible behavior.65
Thus, Bennett suggests, criminal violence by athletes may be a violation
of not merely the law, but also of a public trust.
Bennett's views are echoed in the Royals case, in which the athlete-
defendants apparently received harsher sentences because they were
"role models for children."66 Similar themes have been sounded in other
cases. For instance, when high school basketball player Dajuan Wagner
was recently sentenced for assault, the judge noted that "to the young
people of New Jersey and Camden he's a star," and suggested that celeb-
rity status imposed additional responsibilities on him.67
To be sure, the enhanced-culpability argument is subject to numerous
objections and qualifications. Many athletes, though presently rich and
famous, come originally from disadvantaged backgrounds and/or belong
to racial minority groups - factors that should undercut some of our as-
sumptions relating to athletes' privileged social status. Additionally, ath-
letes are said to be "spoiled" by society, and therefore suffer from
"arrested emotional development."6 In a similar vein, some commenta-
tors note a particular "socialization process" that may fuel sexual vio-
lence: The "elevated status of successful athletes exposes them to
63. BENEDICr & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 8 ("Given that NFL players have extraordi-
nary earning opportunities, conventional wisdom suggests that they would be less inclined to
turn to crime . .
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id.
66. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1328.
67. Plts: Basketball; Dajuan Wagner Given Probation, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2001, at D7.
68. BENEDICr & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 64 (quoting criminal defense lawyer Jay
Ethington).
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exceptional amounts of illicit behavior, particularly in the form of sexual
activity."6 9 Finally, as former NBA star Charles Barkley reminds us, ath-
letes do not necessarily seek, or accept, the job of being a role model for
children.70
The persuasiveness of the enhanced-culpability argument may thus
vary considerably from case to case. But, assuming that there are cases
in which the argument is relatively compelling, should sentencing courts
take into account this enhanced culpability arising from the status of be-
ing an elite athlete? In the federal system, courts are required to con-
sider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendants,"71 as well as "the need for the sentence
imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense.., and to provide just
punishment."'72 Yet, while these broad statutory mandates surely en-
compass personal culpability considerations, the federal Guidelines spec-
ify that that socioeconomic status is "not relevant in the determination
of a sentence."'73 This injunction would apparently rule out wealth and
fame as appropriate considerations, even to the extent that they bear on
the defendant's culpability.74
Perhaps, though, a federal court may still take into account the ath-
lete's violation of his putative responsibilities as a role model. At least
one case indicates that a defendant may be sentenced at the top of a
Guidelines range for committing fraud after assuming a position of
"moral leadership" in the community.7' Although this case did not in-
volve an athlete, it does at least suggest that courts may distinguish be-
tween socioeconomic status and role model status.76 The distinction is
69. BENEDICr, supra note 16, at 26.
70. Holly M. Burch & Jennifer B. Murray, An Essay on Athletes as Role Models, Their
Involvement in Charities, and Considerations in Starting a Private Foundation, 6 SPoRTS LAW.
J. 249,257 (1999) (discussing the debate over Barkley's "I'm not a role model" commercial for
Nike).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
72. § 3553(a)(2).
73. U.S. SENTENCING GumEL-Es MANUAL § 5H1.10 (1998).
74. Although it has not rigorously defined "socioeconomic status," the Supreme Court
has indicated that the factor "need not be invoked by name to be rejected," suggesting a
functional analysis to determine the scope of the term. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81,
110 (1996).
75. United States v. Gunderson, 211 F.3d 1088, 1089 (8th Cir. 2000).
76. The Supreme Court has indicated that "socioeconomic status" is not an infinitely elas-
tic term. Koon, 518 U.S. at 110 (holding that job loss and socioeconomic status are "not the
semantic or practical equivalents of each other").
Some additional support for the enhanced-culpability argument may be found in govern-
ment corruption cases, in which courts have found it appropriate to consider loss of public
confidence in government as a sentencing factor. See, e.g., United States v. Schweitzer, 5 F.3d
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perhaps most compelling where an athlete-defendant affirmatively holds
himself out as a role model.77 In such cases, the enhanced-culpability
argument will least likely seem a proxy for sentencing based on forbid-
den socioeconomic considerations.7"
The enhanced-culpability argument would appear somewhat easier
to make in New York. To be sure, New York emphasizes "societal pro-
tection, rehabilitation, and deterrence" as the purposes of penal sanc-
tions.79 These utilitarian objectives do not necessarily square well with
moralistic arguments about relative blameworthiness."0 Yet, there is no
indication that the New York courts are rigorous in their utilitarianism.
Indeed, a New York court must provide "careful consideration of all
facts available at the time of sentencing,"'" including "the nature and
circumstances of both the defendant and the crime." 2 Relevant consid-
erations include such diverse factors bearing on culpability as: the defen-
dant's having been a victim of domestic abuse; 3 childhood deprivation;' 4
lack of desire for personal gain; 5 perjury during trial testimony; 6 viola-
tion of the victim's trust; 7 lack of remorse;88 and the heinousness of the
offense. 9 While no published case has expressly ruled on the matter,
there seems little reason to doubt that a New York court could properly
consider personal characteristics such as wealth, fame, and role model
status at sentencing.
Finally, Minnesota expressly endorses a "just desserts" theory of sen-
tencing, 90 in contrast to New York's more utilitarian approach. Accord-
ingly, the enhanced-culpability argument cannot be rejected on the basis
44, 48 (3d Cir. 1993). If loss in confidence in one social institution (government) may be
considered, then perhaps so, too, may be a loss of confidence in another (professional sports).
77. Think, for instance, of Michael Jordan's "I want to be like Mike" commercials as a
prototype.
78. Viewed in this light, Charles Barkley's "I am not a role model" commercials may have
been a savvy disclaimer of role model status in order to reduce sentencing exposure.
79. Farrar, 419 N.E.2d at 865 (N.Y. 1981). See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6) (McKinney
2001).
80. People v. Stewart, 394 N.Y.S.2d 690, 691 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (rejecting trial court's
sentence as retributive and inconsistent with the purposes of reformation and rehabilitation).
81. Farrar, 419 N.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added).
82. People v. Peters, 714 N.Y.S.2d 818, 820-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (emphasis added).
83. People v. Johnson, 613 N.Y.S.2d 160, 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
84. People v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (N.Y. 1994).
85. Peters, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 821.
86. Id.
87. People v. Smith, 710 N.Y.S.2d 648, 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
88. Id.
89. People v. Motter, 653 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
90. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. I.
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of overarching penal policy objectives. However, Minnesota, like the
federal system, discourages the use of a wide range of personal charac-
teristics at sentencing. Thus, the Sentencing Guidelines Commission has
indicated that "sentencing should be neutral with respect to offenders'
... income levels." 91 Departures from presumptive Guidelines ranges
on the basis of "employment factors" and "social factors" are expressly
barred.92 Though the Minnesota Guidelines do not use the term "socio-
economic status," sentencing based on wealth and celebrity would ap-
pear to be inconsistent with the Guidelines. No cases suggest the
contrary. Like the federal Guidelines, though, the Minnesota Guidelines
may leave open the possibility of taking into account the betrayal of role
model responsibilities.
B. Enhanced Deterrence Value
Even if athlete criminals are not more blameworthy than others,
there may still be compelling reasons to sentence them more harshly. In
particular, the social prominence of elite athletes may lend enhanced de-
terrent value to severe sentences. The argument might take one of two
forms. First, the extensive media coverage in athlete cases provides a
particularly visible public forum for the state to reinforce legal norms. A
long sentence for a famous athlete may more effectively convey the mes-
sage of punishment risks to other prospective offenders than would a
comparable sentence for a less well-known defendant. Both sentences
would result in the same incarceration costs, but the one would likely
have a greater deterrent effect than the other. In a similar vein, it has
been suggested that the prosecution of Warren Moon under a new do-
mestic violence law in Texas may have been partially motivated by a
desire to publicize the law to other prospective abusers.93
Second, to the extent that athletes are role models, society might rea-
sonably place a premium on athletes' compliance with the law. Thus,
Congressman Bernie Sanders, in calling for a national "summit" on vio-
lence by athletes, has argued: "Sports leaders, as role models, are often
emulated both on and off the field .... As role models, these sports
leaders can send a strong message that rough and tumble, hard-nosed
competition stops when players leave the field .... ,,94 For the same rea-
91. Id. § 244 app. II.D., cmt. I.D.101.
92. § 244 app. II.D.1.c-d.
93. Robinson, supra note 18, at 1328-29.
94. Press Release, Rep. Bernie Sanders, Sanders Calls for a National Summit on Sports
and Violence (July 24, 1996), available at 1996 WL 11123982.
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son, another commentator has suggested that disciplinary action by
leagues against "athlete-abusers" might have "a disproportionately posi-
tive impact" on the overall incidence of domestic violence .95 Similarly,
to the extent that harsh sentences against athletes would more effec-
tively encourage athletes as a class to comply with the law, such
sentences might have a "disproportionately positive impact." Again, the
implication is that the deterrent effects of scarce penal resources might
be maximized by focusing those resources on elite athletes.
Like the enhanced-culpability argument, the enhanced-deterrence
argument is subject to various objections and qualifications. For in-
stance, because many elite athletes belong to minority groups, enhanced
sentences against athletes may be perceived as racially discriminatory.
Perceptions of discrimination undercut the legal system's legitimacy, es-
pecially in minority communities, thereby potentially undermining the
goal of greater compliance with the law. Additionally, given the compel-
ling professional and financial incentives that athletes already have to
avoid legal entanglements - especially those that might result in incar-
ceration and loss of playing time - it is far from certain that the imposi-
tion of enhanced penalties would achieve any significant additional
deterrent effects among athletes generally.
Assuming some enhanced deterrence, however, could this considera-
tion properly be considered at sentencing? Federal courts are required
by statute to consider deterrence in imposing a sentence.9" Yet, like the
enhanced-culpability argument, the enhanced-deterrence argument is
limited by the federal Guidelines' injunction against consideration of so-
cioeconomic status. To the extent that heavy publicity in a case is a nec-
essary incident of the wealth and celebrity of the defendant, sentencing
on the basis of that publicity would appear inappropriate. However, in-
sofar as role-model status may be distinguished from socioeconomic sta-
tus - as suggested above - federal courts may be able to consider the
social benefits of heightened incentives for athletes to obey the law.
New York law likewise authorizes sentencing courts to consider de-
terrence.97 Though the courts have not addressed the issue in any pub-
lished decisions, no apparent doctrinal obstacles would prevent a New
York court from sentencing on the basis of the enhanced-deterrence
arguments.
95. Out of Bounds, supra note 4, at 1052-53.
96. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B).
97. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(6).
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Minnesota offers a striking contrast. The Minnesota Guidelines do
not endorse general deterrence as an appropriate purpose of sentencing.
Rather, sentences must be based "proportional to the severity of the of-
fense of conviction and the extent of the offender's criminal history."98
The Guidelines require sentencing courts to focus on the offender's per-
sonal culpability, rather than the effect of the sentence on future crime
in society at large.99 Moreover, even if deterrence were an appropriate
consideration, the Minnesota Guidelines, as noted above, mandate neu-
trality with respect to "employment, social or economic status,"'100 and at
least one court has suggested that "publicity regarding the case because
of the defendant's public status is ... an improper factor."'' In short,
the enhanced-deterrence argument does not appear to be an appropriate
consideration in Minnesota.
C. Employment Consequences
Thus far, we have considered possible justifications for treating elite
athletes more harshly at sentencing. Yet, arguments might also be ad-
vanced that such athletes should be treated less harshly. In particular,
such arguments might focus on the extraordinary employment and finan-
cial consequences that athletes may suffer as a result of conviction and
incarceration. Unlike most violent criminals, elite athletes possess
highly lucrative employment, as well as the potential for endorsements
and other off-the-field money-making opportunities. Thus, an athlete's
entanglement in the criminal justice system may prove far more costly
than a non-athlete's.
The argument for a corresponding reduction in sentence takes two
forms. First, the athlete may argue that, by virtue of his prosecution and
conviction alone, he has already "suffered enough." His ability to obtain
endorsement deals has been compromised, and he may be subject to
league or team discipline, perhaps even expulsion.'0 2 Given the penal-
ties he has suffered outside the criminal justice system, he is perhaps
98. MiN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. I.
99. Cf State v. Staten, 390 N.W.2d 914,916 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that downward
departures may only be granted based on factors that mitigate the defendant's culpability);
State v. Guerin, No. C3-00-1860, 2001 WL 169978, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2001)
(same).
100. Staten, 390 N.W.2d at 916.
101. Guerin, 2001 WL 169978, at *2.
102. Though not common, there are at least a few notable instances of a player being
expelled from a team or league as a result of a criminal conviction, such as football player
Barn Morris's release from the Pittsburgh Steelers following a felony drug conviction. BENE-
DIcr & YAEGER, supra note 4, at 67.
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entitled to more lenient treatment within the system. 1 3 Second, the ath-
lete's opportunity costs from time in prison may be quite high. Even
losing a single season - which could result from a relatively modest sen-
tence of a few months - may cause millions of dollars in losses. The
marginal day or week or month that an athlete faces in prison may be
worth far more than the same time period for a non-athlete. Thus, an
athlete might argue that - in order to equalize the actual weight of the
punishment - he must receive less time in prison than a non-athlete con-
victed of the same crime.
Once again, we should note that the argument is subject to numerous
objections and qualifications. As to the "already punished enough"
prong, many athletes do not suffer appreciably from having a rap sheet.
Indeed, athletes like Dennis Rodman, Charles Barkley, and Michael Ir-
vin may benefit from their colorful "bad boy" images.1°4 Moreover, as
Benedict and Yaeger have documented, league and team discipline for
off-the-field violence is rare.105 As to the higher-opportunity-costs
prong, lost income in any amount may actually mean far more to low-
and middle-income defendants than millionaire athletes. As an econo-
mist might put it, the marginal dollar is valued more by a poor person
than a rich person, so that, for instance, the poor person's loss of $10,000
in income may be felt more harshly than the athlete's loss of $10 million
in income.' 6 Also, the opportunity costs may be substantially mitigated
103. Quarterback Brian Griese's recent sentence to probation for drunk driving may re-
flect this sort of consideration. The sentencing judge noted the relative strictness of the NFL's
substance abuse program. Plus: Pro Football; Griese Put on Probation, N.Y. TIMES, March 29,
2001, at D7. In a similar vein, baseball player Marcus Moore of the Colorado Rockies was
acquitted of rape and sexual assault because the jury, according to one member, thought
Moore had received "punishment enough" by being sent down to the minors. Robinson,
supra note 18, at 1331-32.
104. Benedict and Yaeger, for instance, suggest that Irvin used his prosecution on drug
charges as a platform to convey a "cool" image to "his public." BENEDICT & YAEGER, supra
note 4, at 64-66.
105. Id. at 5, 15.
106. For the same reason, some critics argue that league fines have little deterrent effect
on players. One NFL player put it this way:
I don't think fines have all that much impact on very many players, even the lower-paid
players.... You can always make more money, and money is kind of an abstract thing
to some guys because at our age, some of us have made so much we don't even know
what that money means. There are guys who are fined $10,000, and it is only a tenth of
what they are making that week.
BENEDICT, supra note 16, at 223-24.
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by scheduling incarceration to occur during off-seasons, as has been
done in a number of instances. 107
In the federal system, neither the Guidelines nor any statute ex-
pressly addresses whether employment consequences may be considered
at sentencing. The Supreme Court, however, took up the issue in its
landmark decision in Koon v. United States.0 Koon arose from the fed-
eral prosecution of the police officers involved in the Rodney King beat-
ing. After they were convicted on civil rights charges, the sentencing
court chose to depart downward from the prescribed Guidelines sen-
tencing range based on several considerations, including the job loss that
the police officers would suffer as a result of their convictions. 0 9 On
appeal, the Supreme Court considered the propriety of this decision." 0
First, the Court rejected the argument that employment consequences
are a "forbidden factor" because they are too closely related to socioeco-
nomic status."' But, second, the Court held that the factor nonetheless
should not have been used as a basis for departure." 2 Specifically, the
Court found that employment consequences did not take the case
outside the "heartland" of typical civil rights violations."3 By their na-
ture, civil rights cases usually involve public officials, and, the Court
held, "[i]t is to be expected that a government official would be subject
to career-related consequences" after being found guilty of a civil rights
violation.114
Koon leaves many important questions unanswered, but is at least
suggestive of how employment consequences ought to be handled in the
federal system. Thus, we know that employment consequences are po-
tentially distinguishable from socioeconomic status.115 Because employ-
107. The case of baseball pitcher Bobby Chouinard supplies one well-publicized example.
Woody Paige, Abusive Athletes Not Above Law, DENVER POSr, Dec. 6, 2000, at Dl. Football
players Randy Moss and James Darling provide additional examples. Daniel Golden, When
College Athletes Misbehave, Often There's Only Token Punishment, BosToN GLOBE, Sept. 11,
1995, at 39; Robinson, supra note 18, at 1332.
108. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
109. Id. at 85-89.
110. Id. at 91.
111. Id. at 110.
112. Id. at 111.
113. Koon, 518 U.S. at 110.
114. Id. at 110-11.
115. Koon did not consider the higher-opportunity-cost version of the employment-conse-
quences argument. Because this turns on income level, it may fall within the forbidden "socio-
economic status" zone. Put differently, a federal court may be able to distinguish between
defendants based on job or career consequences, but not based on the economic costs of such
consequences. Thus, the loss of a $50,000 per year civil service job should be treated the same
at sentencing as the loss of a $5 million per year position in the NBA.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
ment consequences do not appear otherwise to be a forbidden factor,
they can probably be considered when a sentence is selected within a
prescribed Guidelines range. Matters become more complex when the
issue is departure from the Guidelines range. While departure was not
permitted in Koon, the Court limited its holding to the particular circum-
stances of that case.116 Specifically, the Court relied on (1) the nature of
the offense of conviction, and (2) its belief that government officials
would typically suffer employment consequences for committing of-
fenses of that nature. Violent crimes by athletes may be distinguishable.
While most civil rights violations may involve public officials, most as-
sault cases do not involve athletes. Athletes differ from typical offenders
insofar as they stand to suffer professional discipline, lose lucrative en-
dorsement deals, and miss practice and playing time that may be critical
to their careers. To the extent that these distinctions remove elite ath-
letes from the "heartland" of typical violent criminals, they may warrant
downward departure in the federal system.
Like the enhanced-culpability and enhanced-deterrence arguments,
the employment-consequences argument would appear perfectly consis-
tent with the highly discretionary New York system.
Minnesota would be less amenable to the argument. The Minnesota
Guidelines expressly preclude departure based on "employment factors,
including . . . impact of sentence on profession or occupation."' 7 Of
course, this injunction only pertains to departures, and might be read to
permit consideration of employment factors when selecting a sentence
within a Guidelines range. Cases and Commission commentary suggest,
however, that sentencing should generally be neutral with respect to em-
ployment and income."'
IV. CONCLUSION
There is no simple answer to the question of whether elite athletes
should be sentenced differently. Colorable arguments support both
higher and lower sentences. The strength of these arguments may vary
considerably from case to case. Moreover, these arguments cannot be
considered without regard to the sentencing jurisdiction. Sentencing
laws differ from state to state, and from federal to state systems, even at
the most fundamental level of overarching penal objectives.
116. Id. at 110 ("[T]he factor, as it exists in these circumstances, cannot take the suit out of
the heartland .. ") (emphasis added).
117. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. II.D.I.c.
118. Staten, 390 N.W.2d at 916; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244 app. II.D, cmt II.D.101.
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To the extent that a jurisdiction recognizes heightened culpability as
an appropriate sentencing factor, elite athletes could be differentiated
from non-athletes because they possess extraordinary advantages in life,
and because they are widely viewed as role models. Criminal behavior
by elite athletes accordingly seems less excusable and more socially per-
nicious. Yet, insofar as these considerations- are closely tied to athletes'
unique socioeconomic status, they may nonetheless provide an inappro-
priate basis for treating athletes differently in jurisdictions that classify
socioeconomic status as a forbidden factor, such as Minnesota and the
federal system.
Similar issues arise with respect to the enhanced-deterrence argu-
ment. In jurisdictions that do recognize general deterrence as an appro-
priate consideration, heavy publicity in athlete cases, as well as athletes'
role model status, may arguably cause harsh sentences for athletes to
have particularly great social benefits. Yet, in at least some jurisdictions,
these considerations may run afoul of the prohibition against taking so-
cioeconomic status into account.
Lastly, employment consequences may also serve to differentiate
athletes, either under the theory that the athlete "has already been pun-
ished enough" by his prosecution and conviction, or by reference to the
extraordinary career and financial consequences that might result from
incarceration. Yet, this consideration, too, may be constrained by the
prohibition on socioeconomic factors. Here, Minnesota and the federal
system may diverge somewhat in the extent to which employment conse-
quences may be distinguished from socioeconomic considerations.
In short, our review of three jurisdictions suggests three different
ways of dealing with the question of whether athletes should be sen-
tenced differently. Commentators are quick to suggest that the criminal
justice system treats star athletes too leniently. These criticisms, though,
start from largely unexamined assumptions about the appropriate yard-
stick for the treatment of athletes: Should we treat them the same as
non-athletes who have committed the same crimes? Should we seek to
make an example of them? Should all violent criminals be incarcerated
for substantial periods of time? Sentencing law supplies standards by
which the performance of the system may be measured. Despite the im-
portant variations, uncertainties, and complexity in the law, criticisms of
the criminal justice system that neglect this legal framework ring hollow.

